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Abstract. Computational notions of entropy (a.k.a. pseudoentropy) have
found many applications, including leakage-resilient cryptography, deter-
ministic encryption or memory delegation. The most important tools to
argue about pseudoentropy are chain rules, which quantify by how much
(in terms of quantity and quality) the pseudoentropy of a given random
variable X decreases when conditioned on some other variable Z (think
for example of X as a secret key and Z as information leaked by a side-
channel). In this paper we give a very simple and modular proof of the
chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy, improving best known parameters.
Our version allows for increasing the acceptable length of leakage in ap-
plications up to a constant factor compared to the best previous bounds.
As a contribution of independent interest, we provide a comprehensive
study of all known versions of the chain rule, comparing their worst-case
strength and limitations.
1 Introduction
Min-entropy. Various notions of entropy are used to quantify the randomness
in a random variable. The most important notion in cryptographic contexts is
min-entropy, where a variable X (conditioned on Z) has min-entropy k if one
cannot guess X (given Z) with probability better than 2k.
Definition 1. The min-entropy of a variable X is
H∞(X) = − log max
x
Pr[X = x]
More generally, for a joint distribution (X,Z), the average min-entropy of X
conditioned on Z is [DRS04]
H˜∞(X|Z) = − logEz←Z max
x
Pr[X = x|Z = z]
= − logEz←Z2−H∞(X|Z=z) .
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Chain-Rules. Most entropy notions H(.) satisfy a chain rule which roughly cap-
ture the fact that when additionally conditioning on a variable Z, the entropy
can decrease by at most its length |Z|, i.e.,
H(X|Y,Z) ≥ H(X|Y )− |Z| (1)
In particular, average-case min-entropy satisfies such a rule [DRS04]
H˜∞(X|Y,Z) ≥ H˜∞(X|Y )−H0(Z) ≥ H˜∞(X|Y )− |Z| , (2)
where H0(Z) ≤ |Z| denotes the logarithm of the support-size of Z.
Pseudoentropy. Information theoretic entropy notions refer to computationally
unbounded parties, e.g., no algorithm can compress a distribution X (given Z)
below its Shannon entropy H(X|Z) and no algorithm can guess X (given Z)
better than with probability 2− H˜∞(X|Z). Under computational assumptions, in
particular in cryptographic settings, one often has to deal with distribution that
appear to have high entropy only for computationally bounded parties.
The classical example is a pseudorandom distribution [BM84,Yao82], where
X ∈ {0, 1}n is said to be pseudorandom if it cannot be distinguished from the
uniform distribution over {0, 1}n by polynomial size distinguishers. In this case
X appears to have n bits of Shannon and n bits of min-entropy. More generally,
X ∈ {0, 1}n has k bits of HILL entropy, if it cannot be distinguished from
some distribution Y with k bits of min-entropy. Note that for k = n HILL
entropy is simply pseudorandomness, as the only distribution over {0, 1}n with
n bits of min-entropy is the uniform distribution. HILL entropy was introduced
in [HILL99], the more general conditional notion below is from [HLR07].
Definition 2 ( [HLR07]). Let (X,Z) be a joint distribution of random vari-
ables. Then X has conditional HILL entropy k conditioned on Z, denoted by
HHILLε,s (X|Z) ≥ k, if there exists a joint distribution (Y,Z) such that H˜∞(Y |Z) ≥
k, and (X,Z) ∼ε,s (Y, Z).3
Computational notions of entropy find important applications in leakage-resilient
cryptography [DP08b], deterministic encryption [FOR12], memory delegation
[CKLR11], computational complexity [RTTV08a] and foundations of cryptogra-
phy [HRV10].
Chain Rules for Computational Entropy. When considering chain rules as in as
in eq.(1) for computational notions of entropy, one must not only specify by how
much the quantity of the entropy decreases, but also its quality. For some com-
putational entropy notions like Yao or unpredictability entropy, chain rules are
very easy to prove, and have been folklore for a long time (for the short proofs cf.
3 Let us stress that using the same letter Z for the 2nd term in (X,Z) and (Y,Z)
means that we require that the marginal distribution Z of (X,Z) and (Y,Z) is the
same.
Appendix A in [KPWW14]). For HILL entropy the situation is much more com-
plicated. The first chain rules were found independently by [RTTV08b,DP08a],
and several proofs for the chain rule for HILL entropy were given subsequently,
often as a corollary of a more general result. The various proofs give different
qualitative bounds and are summarised below.
Theorem 1 (Chain Rules for HILL Entropy). For any joint distribution
(X,Z) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m we have that
HHILLε′,s′ (X|Z) > HHILLε,s (X)−m−∆ (3)
where ε′ = ε · p(2`, ε−1) and s′ = s/q(2`, ε−1), for some polynomial functions
p(.) and q(.) as summarised in Table 1 (∆ = 0 except for [DP08b], where ∆ =
2 log(1/).
Reference Technique s′ = ′ = Meaningful range
(a) [DP08b] Worst-Case Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · 22m2) O(√2m) s > 2−2m−2, 2−m > 
(b) [RTTV08b] Dense Model Theorem Ω (s · poly(,minz(Pr[Z = z]))) O(2m) s > maxz 1Pr[Z=z]2 · −2, 2−m > 
(c) [FOR12] Worst-Case Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · 22m2) O(2m) s > 22m−2, 2−m > 
(d) [JP14] Simulating Auxiliary Inputs Ω
(
s · 223m − 2m
)
O() s > 24m−2 + 23m−2
(e) [VZ13] Simulating Auxiliary Inputs Ω
(
s · 22m − 12 − 2m
)
O() s > 2m−4 + 22m−2 + 2m−2
(f)
This paper
using [GW10]
Relaxed HILL Entropy Ω
(
s · 22m − 2m
)
O() s > 22m−2 + 2m−2
(g) This paper Average Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · 22m − 2m2
)
O() s > 2m−2 + 22m
Table 1: Qualitative bounds on chain rules for HILL entropy. For simplicity,
smaller order terms log(1/), n, m are hidden under the big-O notation.
As shown in the table, every chain rule losses a factor exponential in m in quality
(either in the size s or in the advantage ) and also a factor poly(). The second
loss is the reason for poor security bounds in applications, for example in security
proofs for leakage resilient stream ciphers (cf. [Pie09] and related papers), but
seems unavoidable given the current state of the art. The choice of whether we
lose 2m in size or advantage depends on an application, as we will see later.
All the chain rules in Table 1 can be slightly generalized. Namely, one can opt
for a larger s′ at the prize of a larger ′. This is possible because the common part
of all the corresponding proofs is an approximation argument (typically by the
Chernoff Bound). The most general statements can be found in Table 2 below.
Table 1 is recovered from Table 2 by setting the free parameter δ to be of the
same order as the other additive term in ′ ( or 2m in the table), in order to
get the smallest possible ′, while keeping the number of parameters small. We
stress that in later discussions, including applications and our results described
in Section 1.2, we refer to the general bounds from Table 2.
New chain rule. We prove the following results
Reference Technique s′ = ′ =
(a) [DP08b] Worst-Case Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · 22mδ2) O(√2m+ δ)
(b) [RTTV08b] Dense Model Theorem Ω
(
s · δ2maxz(Pr[Z=z])2
)
O(2m+ δ)
(c) [FOR12] Worst-Case Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · δ2) O(2m+ δ)
(d) [JP14] Simulating Auxiliary Inputs Ω
(
s · δ223m − 2m
)
O(+ δ)
(e) [VZ13] Simulating Auxiliary Inputs Ω
(
s · δ22m − 1δ2 − 2m
)
O(+ δ)
(f) [GW10] Relaxed HILL Entropy Ω
(
s · δ22m − 2m
)
O(+ δ)
(g) This paper Average Metric Entropy Ω
(
s · δ22m − 2mδ2
)
O(+ δ)
Table 2: Qualitative bounds on chain rules for HILL entropy, in the most general
form with the free parameter δ.
Theorem 2 (Chain rule for metric entropy with loss in size). Let X ∈
{0, 1}n and Z ∈ {0, 1}m be correlated random variables. Then for any (, s) we
have
H
Metric,det,[0,1]
′,s′ (X|Z) > HMetric,det,[0,1],s (X)−m (4)
where s′ = s/2m − 2m and ′ = .
Corollary 1. Let X ∈ {0, 1}n and Z ∈ {0, 1}m be correlated random variables.
Then for any (, s) we have
HHILL′,s′ (X|Z) > HHILL,s (X)−m (5)
where s′ = Ω
(
s
2m · δ
2
n+1−k − 2m · δ
2
n+1−k
)
, ′ =  + δ, δ is arbitrary and k =
HHILL,s (X) (actually k = H
Metric,det,[0,1]
(,s) (X|Z) is enough).
The proofs can be found in Section 3. Our new chain rule (g) loses a leakage-
dependent factor in s instead in , and can be viewed as complementary with
respect to (c) which loses it only in . Later we will see that there are settings
where both chain rules gives equivalent security (basically when  can be chosen
sufficiently small), but for other cases our chain rule might be preferable (when
we start with moderate values of  and aim for relatively small ′). We will
discuss these applications with practically meaningful numerical examples in
Section 1.2.
1.1 Proofs Techniques for Chain Rules
Basically, all the previously known chain rules have been obtained by one of the
two following ways:
(a) bounding pseuodoentropy for every leakage value separately
(b) using so called relaxed pseudoentropy
The first technique, so called decomposable entropy [FR12], can be viewed as
an extension of the dense model theorem which is equvialent when the entropy
amount is full (this equivalence holds up to a constant factor as demonstrated
in [Sko15a]); this approach yields always an exponential (in m) loss for . The
second way is to use the so called “relaxed” pseudoentropy, which offer an ex-
ponential (in m) loss for s, but no loss in . In this paper we come up with
a different approach, namely we first prove a variant of a chain rule for aver-
age metric entropy which loses only in s and then use known transformations
to convert it back to HILL entropy. As shown in Table 1 our approach yields
best possible known loss in s compared to the known chain rules which do not
decrease .
HHILLǫ,s (X) > k
HHILLǫ′,s′ (X |Z = z) > k′
HHILLǫ′′,s′′ (X |Z) > k′′
(Extending D.M.T.)
k′ = k − log
(
1
Pr[Z=z]
)
ǫ′ = ǫ/Pr[Z = z] + δ
s′ = s · δ2
(simple averaging)
k′′ = k − |Z|
ǫ′′ = 2|Z|ǫ + δ
s′′ = s′
(a) Proofs based on bounding the
pseudoentropy for every leakage
outcome separately, which is an ex-
tension of the Dense Model Theo-
rem: chain rules (a),(b) and (c).
HHILLǫ,s (X) > k
HHILL−rlxǫ′,s′ (X |Z) > k′
HHILLǫ′′,s′′ (X |Z) > k′′
(Simulating Leakage)
k′ = k − |Z|
ǫ′ = ǫ+ δ
s′ = s · δ2
2|Z| − 1δ2
(modifying distribution)
k′′ = k′
ǫ′′ = 2ǫ′
s′′ = s′ − 2|Z|
(b) Proofs of going through relaxed
pseudoentropy. The first step is either
by a direct argument (chain rule (f)) or
by leakage simulating techniques (chain
rules (d) and (e)).
HHILLǫ,s (X) > k
H
Metric,det,[0,1]
ǫ′,s′ (X |Z) > k′
HHILLǫ′′,s′′ (X |Z) > k′′
(Average Metric E. Chain Rule )
k′ = k − |Z|
ǫ′ = ǫ
s′ = s · 1
2|Z| − 2
|Z|
(Metric-HILL Transformation)
k′′ = k′
ǫ′′ = ǫ+ δ
s′′ = s′ · δ2
(c) this paper: A proof going through
average metric entropy directly (g).
Fig. 1: Chain rules classified by used proof techniques.
1.2 Qualitative Comparison
Table 1 summarizes the known and our new bonds for the HILL entropy chain
rule. In the first three bounds (a) to (c) the advantage ′ = 2m degrades expo-
nentially in m (with the best result achieved by (c)), whereas in the bounds (d)
to (g) we one have a degradation in the circuit size s′, but the distinguishing
advantage ′ stays the same (up to some small constant hidden on the big-Oh
notation, which we’ll ignore for the rest of this section).
The degradation in circuit size for all bounds (d) to (g) is of the form s′ =
s/α − β, so the circuit size degrades by a factor α and an additive term β.
The best factor α = 2m/2 is achieved by the bounds (e) to (g), and the best
additive loss is achieved by (g). Below we give a numerical example showing
that for some practical settings of parameters this really matters, and (g) gives
meaningful security guarantees whereas (d),(e) and (f) don’t. Comparing (g)
with (c) is less straight forward, because (c) has a degradation in the advantage
whereas (g) does not. To get a meaningful comparison, we consider first settings
where we can assume that the running time to advantage ratio s/ is fixed, and
then discuss the case when no such a simple tradeoff exists.
Fixed time-success ratio (application for weak PRFs). For concreteness, we as-
sume that X = (x1, F (K,x1), . . . , (x`, F (K,x`)) consists of input-output pairs
of a weak PRF F (., .) with key K, and we want to know how good the HILL
entropy of X is given some m bits of leakage about K. This is the setting in
which the chain rule is e.g. used in the security proof of the leakage-resilient
stream-cipher from [Pie09]. For example think of F (., .) as AES256, and assume
its security as a weak PRF satisfies s/ ≈ 2256, which is the case if bruce force
key-search is the best attack.4 Under this assumption, the degradation in cir-
cuit size in [FOR12] and our new bounds (g)) are identical as illustrated with a
concrete numerical example in Table 3.
Chain Rule
Before leakage Leakage After leakage
 s m s′ ≈ ′ ≈
(e) [VZ13]
2−55 2201
46
s · 22m − 12 − 2m < 0
 2−55
(d) [JP14] s · 223m − 2m < 0
(f) [GW10] s · 22m − 2m < 0
(g) this paper s · 22m − 2m2 245
(c) [FOR12] 2−101 2155 s · 22m2 245 2m
Table 3: Numerical example for the degradation is circuit size for the bound
(c),(d),(e) and (f) from Table 1. We assume a distribution which is (, s) pseu-
dorandom where for any s the  is such that s/ = 2256 (we can for example
conjecture that the security of AES256 as a weak PRF satisfies this). Then we
chose s such that we get ′ = 2−55 after m = 46 bits of leakage. Only the (g)
and (c) bound give a non-zero bound for s′ in this case, i.e. s′ ≈ 245 for both.
More generally, assume that we have a weak PRF that has k bits of security,
i.e., it is (s, ) secure for any s/ = 2k (see Definition 3). Then, after leaking
m bits it is (s′, ′) secure for any s′/′ = 2t, where t satisfies the conditions
from Table 4 Let us stress that the equivalence of our bounds and the ones
from [FOR12] only holds in the setting where s/ is basically constant. This is a
4 We consider the security of AES256 as a weak PRF, and not a standard PRF,
because of non-uniform attacks which show that no PRF with a k bit key can have
s/ ≈ 2k security [DTT09], at least unless we additionally require  2−k/2.
reasonable assumption for secret-key primitives, but certainly not for most other
settings like public-key crypto.5
Chain Rule Technique Security after leakage Analysis
(e) [VZ13] Simulating auxiliary inputs t = k5 − m5 Appendix A.1
(d) [JP14] Simulating auxiliary inputs t = k3 − 4m3 Appendix A.2
(f) [GW10] Relaxed HILL Entropy t = k3 − 2m3 Appendix A.3
(c) [FOR12] Dense Model Theorem t = k3 − m3 Appendix A.4
(g) This work Average Metric Entropy t = k3 − m3 Appendix A.5
Table 4: Consider an (s, ) secure weak PRF where s/ = 2k (for any choice of of
s), then after m bits of leakage on the key, the PRF is s′/′ = 2t secure, where
depending on the chain rule used, t can take the values as indicated in the table.
No fixed time-sucess ratio (application for PRGs with weak seeds). To be more
concrete, consider the problem of generating pseudorandomness from weak seeds.
Let PRG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}2n be a length-doubling PRG with known parame-
ters (PRG, sPRG). Suppose that we have a “weak” source X with min-entropy
only n − d. The output of PRG on X is not guaranteed to be pseudorandom,
and in fact it is not secure [DY13]. One way to overcome this problem is so
called “expand-extract” approach [DY13]. Namely, we simply take an extractor
Ext : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n and output Ext (PRG(X)). The proof that the output
is pseudorandom goes by chain rules. In the second approach the roles of the
extractor atincrseed and key X are swaped and then some facts about so called
square-friendly applications are used [DY13]. Since the approach based on the
square-friendly properties or on chain rules derived by extending the dense model
theorem yield a loss in , for settings where d is relatively big (more specifically
when d > log −1PRG) one prefers the use of a chain rule with loss in s. Below in
Table 5 we provide corresponding bounds and a numerical example, where only
our chain rule guarantees meaningful security.
2 Preliminaries
Security definitions. Given a cryptographic primitive, we consider the proba-
bility  of breaking its security (defined as winning the corresponding security
game) by an adversary with running time (circuit size) s. The following definition
is the standard way to define the security level.
5 Consider e.g. RSA, here given our current understanding of the hardness of factoring,
 goes from basically 0 to 1 as the running time s reaches the time required to run
the best factoring algorithms. In any case, it’s not reasonable to assume that s/ is
almost constant over the entire range of s.
Technique
Real security for deficiency d Comments Numerical example (n = 256)
′ s′ PRG sPRG d ′ s′
square-security [DY13]
√
2dPRG Ω (sPRG)
2−40 2176 50
1 288
chain rule (c) 2dPRG + 2
−n−d2 + δ Ω
(
sPRG · δ2
)
δ arbitrary 1 2176
chain rule (f) and (e) PRG + 2
−n−d2 + δ Ω
(
sPRG · δ22d
) δ arbitrary
sPRG > 2
2dδ−2 2
−39 < 0
chain rule (g) PRG + 2
−n−d2 + δ Ω
(
sPRG · δ22d
) δ arbitrary
sPRG > 2
2d 2
−39 246
Table 5: Security of a PRG fed with weak seeds, by “expand-extract-reseed”
technique. We start with a 256-bit PRG output with security parameters
(PRG, sPRG) = (2
−40, 2176), chosen to exclude best known non-uniform at-
tacks [DTT09] which are of complexity s > 2n2. We aim for ′ ≈ 2−39.
Definition 3 (Security of cryptographic primitives, [Lub96]). We say
that a cryptographic primitive has λ bits of security (alternatively: it is 2λ-secure)
if every adversary has time-advantage ratio at least 2λ.
We note that for indistinguishability applications, that is when winning the se-
curity game is equivalent to distinguishing a given object from the ideal object
(like PRFs, PRGs), the advantage is defined as the difference of the winning
probability and 12 which corresponds to chances that a random guess succeeds,
whereas for unpredictability applications (like one-way functions) the advantage
is simply equal the winning probability. In this paper we will consider indistin-
guishability applications only.
Some technical entropy definitions. We consider several classes of distinguishers.
With Drand,{0,1}s we denote the class of randomized circuits of size at most s with
boolean output (this is the standard non-uniform class of distinguishers consid-
ered in cryptographic definitions). The class Drand,[0,1]s is defined analogously, but
with real valued output in [0, 1]. Ddet,{0,1}s ,Ddet,[0,1]s are defined the correspond-
ing classes for deterministic circuits. With δD(X,Y ) = |EX [D(X)]− EY [D(Y )]
we denote D’s advantage in distinguishing X and Y .
Definition 4 (Metric pseudoentropy [BSW03,FR12]). A random variable
X has real deterministic Metric entropy at least k if
H
Metric,Ddet,[0,1]s
,s (X) > k ⇐⇒ ∀D ∈ Ddet,[0,1]s ∃YD , H∞(YD) = k : δD(X,YD) 6 
Relaxed versions of HILL and Metric entropy. A weaker notion of conditional
HILL entropy allows the conditional part to be replaced by some computationally
indistinguishable variable
Definition 5 (Relaxed HILL pseudoentropy [GW11,Rey11]). For a joint
distribution (X,Z), we say that X has relaxed HILL entropy k conditioned on
Z if
HHILL−rlx,s (X|Z) > k
⇐⇒ ∃(Y,Z ′), H˜∞(Y |Z ′) = k, ∀D ∈ Drand,{0,1}s , : δD((X,Z), (Y,Z ′)) 6 
The above notion of relaxed HILL satisfies a chain rule whereas the chain rule for
the standard definition of conditional HILL entropy is known to be false [?]. One
can analogously define relaxed variants of metric entropy, we won’t give these as
they will not be required in this paper. The relaxed variant of HILL entropy is
also useful because one can convert relaxed entropy into standard HILL entropy,
losing in s an additive term exponential in the length of the conditional part.
Lemma 1 (HILL-rlx−→HILL, [JP14]). For any X and correlated Z of length
m, we have HHILL,s′ (X|Z) > HHILL−rlx,s (X|Z) where s′ = s− 2m.
Pseudoentropy against different distinguisher classes. For randomized distin-
guishers, it’s irrelevant if the output is boolean or real values, as we can replace
any D ∈ Drand,[0,1]s with a D′ ∈ Drand,{0,1} s.t. E[D′(X)] = E[D(X)] by setting
(for any x) Pr[D′(x) = 1] = E[D(x)]. For HILL entropy (as well as for its re-
laxed version), it also doesn’t matter if we consider randomized or deterministic
distinguishers in Definition 2, as we always can “fix” the randomness to an op-
timal value. This is no longer true for metric entropy,6 and thus the distincition
betwenn metric and metric star entropy is crucial.
3 Main Result
We start with the following recently proven characterization of the distribution
maximizing expectations under min-entropy constraints (Section 3.1). Based on
this auxiliary result, in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 we prove our chain rules
stated in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
3.1 An auxiliary result on constrained optimization
Lemma 2 (Optimizing expectations under entropy constraints [SGP15,
Sko15b]). Given D : {0, 1}n+m × {0, 1}m → [0, 1] consider the following opti-
mization problem
max
Y |Z
ED(Y,Z)
s.t. H˜∞(Y |Z) > k
(6)
The distribution Y |Z = Y ∗|Z satisfying H˜∞(Y ∗|Z) = k is optimal for (6) if
and only if there exist real numbers t(z) and a number λ > 0 such that for every
z
6 It might be hard to find a high min-entropy distribution Y that fools a randomised
distinguisher D, but this task can become easy once D’s randomness is fixed.
(a)
∑
x max(D(x, z)− t(z), 0) = λ
(b) If 0 < PY ∗|Z=z(x) < maxx′ PY ∗|Z=z(x′) then D(x, z) = t(z).
(c) If PY ∗|Z=z(x) = 0 then D(x, z) 6 t(z)
(d) If PY ∗|Z=z(x) = maxx′ PY ∗|Z=z(x′) then D(x, z) > t(z)
Remark 1. The characterization can be illustrated in an easy and elegant way.
First, it says that the area under the graph of D(x, z) and above the threshold
t(z) is the same, no matter what z is (see Figure 2). Second, for every z the
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Fig. 2: For every z, the (green) area under D(·, z) and above t(z) equals λ
distribution Y ∗|Z = z is flat over the set {x : D(x, z) > t(z)} and vanishes for
x satisfying D(x, z) < t(z), see Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Relation between distinguisher D(x, z), threshold t(z) and distribution
Y ∗|Z = z.
Proof (Proof sketch of Lemma 2). Consider the following linear optimization
program
maximize
Px,z,az
∑
x,z
D(x, z)P (x, z)
subject to −Px,z 6 0, (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m∑
x
Px,z −PZ(z) = 0, z ∈ {0, 1}m
Px,z − az 6 0, z ∈ {0, 1}m∑
z
az − 2−k 6 0
(7)
This problem is equivalent to (6) if we define PY,Z(x, z) = P (x, z) and replace
the condition
∑
z maxx PY,Z(x, z) 6 2−k, which is equivalent to H˜∞(Y |Z) > k,
by the existence of numbers az > maxx PY,Z(x, z) such that
∑
z az 6 2−k. The
solutions of (7) can be characterized as follows:
Claim 1. The numbers (Px,z)x,z, (az)z are optimal for (7) if and only if there
exist numbers λ1(x, z) > 0, λ2(z) ∈ R, λ3(x, z) > 0, λ4 > 0 such that
(a) D(x, z) = −λ1(x, z) + λ2(z) + λ3(x, z) and 0 = −∑x λ3(x, z) + λ4
(b) We have λ1(x, z) = 0 if Px,z > 0, λ
3(x, z) = 0 if Px,z < az, λ
4 = 0 if∑
z az < 2
−k.
Proof (of Claim). This is a straightforward application of KKT conditions. uunionsq
uunionsq
It remains to apply and simplify the last characterization. Let (P ∗x,z)x,z, (a
∗
z)z be
optimal for (7), where P ∗(x, z) = PY ∗,Z(x, z), and λ1(x, z), λ2(z), λ3(x, z), λ4(x)
be corresponding multipliers given by the last claim. Define t(z) = λ2(z) and
λ = λ4. Observe that for every z we have a∗z > max
x
P(x, z) > 2−nPZ(z) > 0
and thus for every (x, z) we have
λ1(x, z) · λ3(x, z) = 0 (8)
If P ∗(x, z) = 0 then P ∗(x, z) < a∗(z) and λ3(x, z) = 0, hence D(x, z) 6 t(z)
which proves (c). If P ∗(x, z) = maxx′ P ∗(x, z) then P ∗(x, z) < 0 and λ1(x, z) = 0
which proves (d). Finally observe that (8) implies
max(D(x, z)− t(z), 0) = max(−λ1(x, z) + λ3(x, z), 0) = λ3(x, z)
Hence, the assumption
∑
x λ
3(x, z) = λ4 = λ proves (a). Suppose now that the
characterization given in the Lemma is satisfied. Define P ∗(x, z) = PY,Z(x, z)
and az = maxz PY ∗,Z(x, z), let λ
3(x, z) = max(D(x, z) − t(z), 0), λ1(x, z) =
max(t(z) − D(x, z), 0) and λ4 = λ. We will show that these numbers satisfy
the conditions described in the last claim. By definition we have −λ1(x, z) +
λ2(z) + λ3(x, z) = D(x, z), by the assumptions we get
∑
x λ
3(x, z) = λ = λ4.
This proves part (a). Now we verify the conditions in (b). Note that D(x, z) <
t(z) is possible only if PY ∗|Z=z(x) = 0 and D(x, z) > t(z) is possible only if
PY ∗|Z=z(x) = maxx′ PY ∗|Z=z(x′). Therefore, if PY,Z(x, z) > 0 then we must
have D(x, z) > t(z) which means that λ1(x, z) = 0. Similarly if PY,Z(x, z) <
maxz PY ∗,Z(x, z) then D(x, z) 6 t(z) and λ3(x, z) = 0. Finally, since we assume
H˜∞(Y ∗|Z) = k we have
∑
z az = 2
−k and thus there is no additional restrictions
on λ4. uunionsq
3.2 New chain rule for Metric entropy
We start by sketching the idea of the proof. Assuming contrarily, we have a
function D of complexity D′ which distinguishes between (X,Z) and all distri-
butions (Y,Z) such that H˜∞(Y |Z) > k −m. By Lemma 2 we can replace D by
a distinguisher D′ which is regular conditioned on the second argument, that is
ED(U, z) = const independently on z. This is the key trick in our proof.
Proof (of Theorem 2 ). Suppose not. There exists real-valued D of size s′ such
that
ED(X,Z)− ED(Y, Z) > , ∀Y : H∞(Y |Z) > k −m. (9)
The distribution Y ∗ which minimizes the left-hand side is optimal to the program
in (6) (where k is replaced by k−m). We start by showing that we can actually
assume that D has a very strong property, namely is regular.
Claim (Regular distinguisher). There exists D′ of complexity size(D)+2m which
satisfies Equation (9) in place of D, and is regular, that is
∑
xD(x, z) = λ for
some λ and every z.
Proof (Proof of Claim). Let t(z) and λ be as in Lemma 2. Define D′(x, z) =
max(D(x, z) − t(z), 0). It is easy to see that Y ∗ is optimal also when D is re-
placed by D′. Moreover, we have ED′(X,Z) > ED(X,Z)−λ and ED′(Y ∗, Z) =
ED′(Y ∗, Z)− λ and thus ED′(X,Z)− ED′(Y ∗, Z) > . Therefore,
ED′(X,Z)− ED′(Y,Z) > , ∀Y : H∞(Y |Z) > k −m (10)
note that we have ∑
x
D′(x, z) = λ, ∀z (11)
which finishes the proof. uunionsq
Having transformed our distinguisher into a more convenient form we define
D′′(x, z) = max
z
D′(x, z). (12)
Claim. We have ED′′(X) > ED′(X,Z).
Proof. This follows by the definition of D′′. uunionsq
Claim. For every Y such that H∞(Y ) > k we have ED′′(Y ) 6 ED′(Y ∗, Z)
Proof. We get
ED′′(Y ) 6 2−k
∑
x
max
z
D′(x, z)
6 2−k
∑
x,z
D′(x, z)
= 2−k+m · λ = ED′(Y ∗, Z) (13)
where in the last line we have used the fact that D′ is regular (see Equation (11))
and that HminAv(Y ∗|Z) = k −m uunionsq
Combining the last two claims we get ED′′(X) − ED′′(Y ) >  for all Y of
min-entropy k. It remains to observe that the complexity of D′′ equals s =
(s′ + 2m) · 2m. uunionsq
3.3 The chain rule for HILL entropy
Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 2 by the following result being a tight version
of the transformation originally due to [BSW03]
Theorem 3 (Metric−→HILL entropy, [Sko15a]). For any n-bit random
variable X and a correlated random variable Z we have
HHILL(s′,′) (X|Z) > HMetric,D
det,[0,1]
(s,) (X|Z)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is an arbitrary parameter, s′ = Ω (s · δ2/(∆+ 1)), ′ =  + δ
and ∆ = n− k is the entropy deficiency.
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A Time-Success Ratio Analysis
A.1 Chain rule given by Vadhan and Zheng
Theorem 4 (Time-success ratio for chain rule (e)). Suppose that X has
n bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ) for every s/ > 2k. Then X conditioned
on leakage of m bits has n−m bits of HILL entropy of quality (s′, ′) for every
s′/′ > 2t where
t =
k
5
− m
5
(14)
and this is the best possible bound guaranteed by chain rule (e).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Suppose that we have s′ = s · 2−mδ2 − δ−2 − 2m
and ′ =  + δ. We want to find the minimum value of the ratio s
′
′ under
the assumption that , δ, s can be chosen in the possibly most plausible way.
Therefore, we want to solve the following min-max problem
min
′,s′
max
s,,δ
s′
′
s.t.
s

= 2k, + δ = ′, s′ = s · 2−mδ2 − δ−2 − 2m
(15)
First, we note that
s′ = 2k−m(′ − δ)δ2 − δ−2 − 2m
Also, since δ < ′, we need to assume ′ > 2−
k−m
5 and ′ > 2−
k−2m
3 to guarantee
that s′ > 0. Now, for δ = Θ(′) we get
s′
′
= Ω
(
2k−m′2 − ′−3 − 2m′−1) = Ω (2max( 35 ·(k−m), k+m3 )) (16)
provided that ′  2− k−m5 and ′  2− k−2m3 . uunionsq
A.2 Chain rule given by Jetchev and Pietrzak
Theorem 5 (Time-success ratio for chain rule (d)). Suppose that X has
n bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ) for every s/ > 2k. Then X conditioned
on leakage of m bits has n−m bits of HILL entropy of quality (s′, ′) for every
s′/′ > 2t where
t =
k
3
− 4m
3
(17)
and this is the best possible bound guaranteed by chain rule (d).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Suppose that we have s′ = s ·2−3mδ2−2m and ′ =
+ δ. We want to find the minimum value of the ratio s
′
′ under the assumption
that , δ, s can be chosen in the possibly most plausible way. Therefore, we want
to solve the following min-max problem
min
′,s′
max
s,,δ
s′
′
s.t.
s

= 2k, + δ = ′, s′ = s · 2−3mδ2 − 2m
(18)
First, we note that
s′ = 2k−3m(′ − δ)δ2 − 2m
Also, since δ < ′, we need to assume ′ > 2−
k−4m
3 to guarantee that s′ > 0.
Now, setting δ = Θ(′) we have
s′
′
= Ω
(
2k−m′2
)− 2m′−1 = Ω (2 k−2m3 ) (19)
provided that ′  2− k−4m3 . uunionsq
A.3 Chain rule given by Gentry and Wichs
Theorem 6 (Time-success ratio for chain rule (f)). Suppose that X has
n bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ) for every s/ > 2k. Then X conditioned
on leakage of m bits has n−m bits of HILL entropy of quality (s′, ′) for every
s′/′ > 2t where
t =
k
3
− 2m
3
(20)
and this is the best possible bound guaranteed by chain rule (f).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). Suppose that we have s′ = s · 2−mδ2− 2m and ′ =
+ δ. We want to find the minimum value of the ratio s
′
′ under the assumption
that , δ, s can be chosen in the possibly most plausible way. Therefore, we want
to solve the following min-max problem
min
′,s′
max
s,,δ
s′
′
s.t.
s

= 2k, + δ = ′, s′ = s · 2−mδ2 − 2m
(21)
First, we note that
s′ = 2k−m(′ − δ)δ2 − 2m
Also, since δ < ′, we need to assume ′ > 2−
k−2m
3 to guarantee that s′ > 0.
Now, setting δ = Θ(′) we have
s′
′
= Ω
(
2k−m′2
)− 2m′−1 = Ω (2 k+m3 ) (22)
provided that ′  2− k−2m3 . uunionsq
A.4 Chain rule given by Fuller and Reyzin
Theorem 7 (Time-success ratio for chain rule (c)). Suppose that X has
n bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ) for every s/ > 2k. Then X conditioned
on leakage of m bits has n−m bits of HILL entropy of quality (s′, ′) for every
s′/′ > 2t where
t =
k
3
− m
3
(23)
and this is the best possible bound guaranteed by chain rule (c).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7). Suppose that we have s′ = s · δ2 and ′ = 2m+ δ.
We want to find the minimum value of the ratio s
′
′ under the assumption that
, δ, s can be chosen in the possibly most plausible way. Therefore, we want to
solve the following min-max problem
min
′,s′
max
s,,δ
s′
′
s.t.
s

= 2k, 2m+ δ = ′, s′ = s · δ2
(24)
First, we note that
s′ = 2k−m(′ − δ)δ2
Also, since δ < ′, we need to assume ′ > 2−
k−m
3 to guarantee that s′ > 1. Now,
setting δ = Θ(′) we have
s′
′
= Ω
(
2k−m′2
)
= Ω
(
2
k−m
3
)
, (25)
provided that ′ > 2−
k−m
3 . uunionsq
A.5 Chain rule in this paper
Theorem 8 (Time-success ratio for chain rule (g)). Suppose that X has
n bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ) for every s/ > 2k. Then X conditioned
on leakage of m bits has n−m bits of HILL entropy of quality (s′, ′) for every
s′/′ > 2t where
t =
k
3
− m
3
(26)
and this is the best possible bound guaranteed by chain rule (g).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8). Suppose that we have s′ = s·2−mδ2−2mδ2 and ′ =
+ δ. We want to find the minimum value of the ratio s
′
′ under the assumption
that , δ, s can be chosen in the possibly most plausible way. Therefore, we want
to solve the following min-max problem
min
′,s′
max
s,,δ
s′
′
s.t.
s

= 2k, + δ = ′, s′ = s · 2−mδ2 − 2mδ2
(27)
First, we note that
s′ = 2k−m(′ − δ)δ2 − 2mδ2
Also, since δ < ′, we need to assume ′ > 2−(k−2m) and ′ > 2−
k−m
3 to guarantee
that s′ > 0. Setting δ = Θ(′) we obtain
s′
′
= Ω
(
2k−m′2
)− 2m′ = Ω (2k−m′2) (28)
provided that ′  2−(k−2m) and ′ > 2− k−m3 . If t is the security level, we must
have t < min
(
k − 2m, k−m3
)
and k −m− 2t > t. uunionsq
